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Resolving Conflicts between Information 
Ownership and Intellectual Freedom 
YALEM. BRAUNSTEIN 
ABSTRACT 
THETENSION BETWEEN information ownership and intellectual 
freedom emerges both from the balancing of economic and political 
interests and as a result of the underlying structure of communications 
and information industries. This theme is addressed in the context 
of a review of the articles by Eaton, Milevsky, and Wilson which 
appear in this issue of Library  Trends. 
INTRODUCTION 
The current legal and economic view of the statutory mechanisms 
by which we establish and enforce ownership rights in intellectual 
property-copyright and patent-is that they seek to balance the 
incentives for authors, artists, and inventors to create new works with 
the benefits to society from having such works available freely 
(Braunstein et al., 1977; Bush & Dreyfuss, 1979). But the origins of 
copyright are not based in this balancing approach nor does this 
logic necessarily carry over to other forms of protection-e.g., trade 
secrecy rights, in the commercial context, and national security 
restrictions such as “classification.” 
The tension between ownership of (the exercise of property rights 
in) information and the concept of intellectual freedom arises from 
two foundations: The first is the perceived need for state power and 
the desire of the state to exercise control-and sometimes limit the 
control of others-over communications media and messages; the 
second is the underlying economics of the production and distribution 
of information, especially the interplay of communications 
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technology and economics. This article describes the nature of this 
tension and, in so doing, analyzes several of the points raised in 
the articles by Eaton, Milevski, and Wilson which appear in this 
issue of Library Trends. 
THEROLE OROF THE STATEIN DISSEMINATING 
RESTRICTINGINFORMATION 
The potential for conflict that Wilson sees between intellectual 
freedom and ownership rights in intellectual property is not new. 
One can go back to the original meaning of “copyright”-the 
privileges granted to certain printers by the Crown. In England, prior 
to the Statute of Anne in 1710, copyright referred to the exclusive 
rights given to members of the Stationers’ Company and was seen 
as a legal means of restricting unbridled use of the new printing 
technology. Starting with the Statute of Anne, copyright in Europe 
was transformed into a means of protecting the rights of authors. 
That this transformed notion of copyright is meant to provide 
incentives for the creation of literary and scientific works can be 
seen in the provision in the United States Constitution: “The Congress 
shall have power to ...p romote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Sect. 8, Para. 
8). 
But the tension between dissemination and control has never 
been eliminated. We currently consider i t  to be mostly between 
competing economic interests-rewards for authors versus benefits 
to society. Wilson shows that the recognition of “derivative” rights, 
the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted 
work” (17 U.S.C., 5 106, 1976) in the revision of the U.S. Copyright 
Law moves the conflict between property rights and intellectual 
freedom from merely an abstract concern to reality. 
Wilson believes that a uniform system of copyright (across all 
levels of originality and all technologies) is a primary factor in the 
tension between rights in intellectual property and intellectual 
freedom. He draws on an Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
analysis of the difficulties in applying copyright law to new 
technologies to support his view. The OTA report distinguishes 
between works of art, works of fact, and functional works, and argues 
that different degrees of protection may be appropriate across these 
three classes (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1986). 
In that the OTA report focuses on the technological origins of 
the distinctions across the classes, i t  owes much to John Hersey’s 
(1979) dissent from the software recommendations of the National 
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU). Hersey primarily distinguishes communications which 
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have human beings as both sender and receiver from those with 
machines, but i t  is clear that he sees further problems raised by the 
existence of “adaptations.” In this, his concerns parallel many of 
those raised by Wilson. 
We are reminded by Milevski (in this issue of Library  Trends) 
that governments continue to restrict the flow of information. One 
might question her contention that the need for national security 
controls on the flow of information is noncontroversial and wish 
for the debate to be put in the broader context of restrictions in 
the flow of information. Nevertheless, her discussion of the changes 
in the approach to, and methods of, implementation provide a useful 
overview of the topic. 
THEROLEOF ECONOMIESOF SCALE 
IN MEDIASTRUCTURE 
The major economic factor influencing both the structure of 
communications and information industries and the pressure for 
government regulation of many of these industries is economies of 
scale. Loosely speaking, economies of scale is the low cost of serving 
another user given one has made the investment in production and/ 
or distribution facilities (or both); its presence or absence is, at least 
partially, determined by the underlying technology. Scale economies 
are of ten known by industry-specific names such as high “first-copy 
costs” in printing and publishing, and “network economies” in 
point-to-point telecommunications. The presence of economies of 
scale, even if unchecked by government action, does not immediately 
lead to monopoly production or distribution. Among the factors that 
influence the number of competing entities in  a given market are 
the distribution of tastes of the consumers, the relationship between 
the size of a firm with low production costs and the overall size of 
the market, and the viable technologies utilized and the mix of 
products and services produced (see Baumol et al., 1988; Scherer, 1980). 
Economies of scale and related phenomena have been cited as 
the primary reasons for the need for a single ubiquitous telephone 
network, the death of competing large city newspapers, the growth 
of newspaper chains, and the dominance of the three commercial 
television networks. Ignoring for the moment that the technologies 
in many of these areas are changing, the traditional policy responses 
generally include licensing and public utility regulation. For example, 
Eaton states in this issue of Library Trends: 
With the exception of film, which originally was viewed by the courts 
as an entertainment medium and therefore not covered by the First 
Amendment (but which now enjoys full First Amendment protections) 
(ALA, 1986, pp. 22-23), other new technologies have not been viewed 
as appropriate to First Amendment protections. Public policy in  the 
United States veered from the First Amendment approach of an earlier 
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paper communications environment and began to rely instead on  anti- 
trust law and licensing of channels, cables, or wavelengths. (Eaton, this 
issue of Library Trends). 
But this statement ignores the significant differences between 
common carriers on the one hand and broadcasters on the other. 
This is the fundamental choice as to whether the medium is to serve 
primarily as a conduit for messages and programming provided by 
others or whether the owners of the medium are to be able to exercise 
editorial control. Furthermore, i t  leads one to an erroneous dichotomy 
as illustrated in Eaton’s next statement: 
While the various media allow for very broad public access at  output, 
they also narrow access at the point of input since those who control 
the channels, airwaves, and cables also control what is broadcast or 
transmitted. (Eaton, this issue of Library Trends) 
In other words, while the limits on access (at the point of input) 
and control appear to be determined by technology and economics, 
they are fundamentally determined by the policy choice of how a 
given communications medium is to be organized. The Commun- 
ications Act of 1934 has two major sections, one relating to 
broadcasting and the other to common carriage (47 U.S.C., 3 151, 
1970). Although the policy choice to view and regulate radio (and, 
by extension, television) as other than a common carrier was made 
prior to the 1934 Act, this question was partially reopened with the 
emergence of cable television. Cable television, i t  has been argued, 
has characteristics of both a broadcaster and a common carrier, and, 
as a result, was considered by the FCC to “fall between the cracks.” 
Without legislative guidance, the ultimate decision on which regime 
to apply was left to the courts (see FCC u. Midwest Vzdeo COT@., 
1979). 
The distinction between broadcasting with its editorial control 
and common carriage can define the terms of access. This is true 
both of access by program producers to the means of distribution 
and of access by the public to a diverse mix of programming (see 
Owen, 1970). However, i t  has been shown that while mandated access 
by programmers at rates fixed by regulation may increase access by 
programmers, i t  has the potential of reducing the diversity of offerings 
available to viewers (Besen & Johnson, 1982). 
VERTICALRELATIONSHIPS 
Analyses of economies of scale focus on the appropriate size and 
number of entities at only one level in the production-distribution-
usage chain. But often we find a single entity that operates at more 
than one stage on this chain, possibly through common ownership 
of divisions that operate at two or more levels. Furthermore, it is 
possible that exclusive relationships might keep a supplier at one 
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level from selling to a distributor at another level (or vice versa). 
While these vertical relationships have the possibility of restricting 
access, it is also argued that they enable new material to be produced. 
This can be the result of the financial resources that the multidivi- 
sional organization can bring to the market or the reduction in risk 
and transactions costs that result from having a guaranteed source 
of supply (or guaranteed market, depending on one’s perspective). 
The Lacy Commission argued for dropping any restrictions on 
the entry of American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) into the 
information services market (ALA, 1986). Eaton, on the other hand, 
worries about the risk of competitors being overwhelmed by AT&T 
(this issue of Library Trends). The divestiture of the Bell System 
may have reduced any need for concerns about bigness per se; however, 
the specific issues that are raised by vertical integration are still present 
in a world where the “Baby Bells” (the former Bell System local 
operating companies and their seven regional holding companies) 
are mounting a new drive to provide a variety of information services. 
Unfortunately, these more complex issues are not covered well in 
either the Lacy Report or Eaton’s article. 
WHATDOESFREEACCESSMEAN? 
Both Eaton and the Lacy Commission appear to move between 
two different concepts when discussing “free access” to information 
(see Eaton’s article in this issue; ALA, 1986). This is most likely 
due to the dual meaning of the word free in the English language. 
We use the same word to mean “unhindered” and “without charge” 
while many other languages use two different words for these separate 
concepts (compare “liber” and “gratis” in French, for example). This 
problem of dual definition appears in the discussion of government 
user fees restricting access to federal data sources and in the notion 
that i t  is “inherently discriminatory” for a library to charge for access 
to electronic databases. (Eaton, this issue. See also, ALA, 1986). 
The Lacy Commission seems implicitly to be aware that the 
imposition of fees can, under certain circumstances, improve access 
by encouraging entry of additional information providers and by 
providing libraries with funds that are of ten otherwise unavailable 
(ALA, 1986). Eaton points out, however, that such views are in conflict 
with stated ALA policies. 
CONCLCJSION 
As Eaton points out, the Lacy Commission argues for “a 
consistent policy to maximize the availability of information from 
the government to its citizens” (Eaton, this issue. See also, ALA, 
1986). But this consistency should be limited. If we accept the premise 
that, at least in some instances, user fees can generate revenues that 
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allow producers of information to expand or at least continue their 
operations, it is reasonable to support the imposition of such fees 
so that more information is made available. But should this policy 
be extended to fees charged by public libraries? If not, is the rationale 
based on sound logic or simply on a bias toward having a base level 
of service provided without charge? 
Similarly, should the desire for consistency prevent us from 
having different forms of property rights for different types of 
information even if, as Wilson shows, maintaining consistency can 
lead to a reduction in intellectual freedom? It may be time to reconsider 
the notion of a single form of copyright which is applicable across 
works that may have far different levels of originality and that are 
produced in a variety of technologies. 
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